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Merit-Based Sentencing Reductions:  
Moving Forward on Specifics, and Some 
Critique of the New Model Penal Code 
Rory K. Little 
In the Essay that follows, Michael Santos tells a remarkable story. 
Arrested at age twenty-three, Santos served twenty-six years in the federal 
prison system. While in prison, Santos published articles and books,1 and 
earned college and master’s degrees, despite what he describes as 
affirmatively obstructionist decisions by “corrections” personnel.2 
Immediately after his release in 2013, Santos began lecturing at a respected 
state university.3 Today, he has a website;4 course materials for persons 
facing lengthy prison sentences; scores of supporters and mentors;5 and the 
charisma and character to hold a law symposium audience spellbound for 
every minute of his thirty-minute presentation. Those who teach know 
how difficult that can be! 
 
   Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco. My 
thanks go to Allen Dreschel (UC Hastings ‘15) for indefatigable research assistance; Rob Taboada 
(UC Hastings ‘15) for his invitation and support for the Symposium, of which this Essay is a small part; 
and to Emily Goldberg Knox (UC Hastings ‘15), the Editor-in-Chief for Volume 66 of the Hastings Law 
Journal, and my sometimes student, for her always stimulating yet understanding patience. 
 1. Michael G. Santos, About Prison (2003); Michael G. Santos, Earning Freedom: 
Conquering a 45-Year Prison Term (2012); Michael G. Santos, Gangsters and Thugs: 
Consequences That Hustlers Pay (2007); Michael G. Santos, Inside: Life Behind Bars in 
America (2007); Michael Santos, Profiles from Prison: Adjusting to Life Behind Bars (2003); 
Michael G. Santos, Triumph!: Straight-A Guide: Conquering Imprisonment and Preparing 
Prisoners for Re-entry (2013); Michael G. Santos, What if I Go to Prison?: Long-Term Prisoner 
Describes Criminal Justice System, Prison, and Issues to Consider When Contemplating the 
Possibility of Imprisonment (2003). 
 2. See Michael Santos, Incentivizing Excellence: A Suggestion for Merit-Based Reductions from a 
Twenty-Six-Year Prison Insider, 66 Hastings L.J.1549 (2015).  
 3. See Michael Santos, Fall 2013 Syllabus for Criminal Justice 451: The Architecture of 
Imprisonment, S.F. State Univ., https://syllabus.sfsu.edu/syllabus/view/20134-R-11878 (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2015). 
 4. Michael G. Santos: Earning Freedom, http://michaelsantos.com/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2015). 
 5. See, e.g., Former Inmate Speaks Out Against U.S. ‘Commitment’ to Mass Incarceration, PBS 
NewsHour (Apr. 2, 2014, 6:29 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/santos-former-prisoner-looks-help-
others/; Partial List of Endorsements (More Available upon Request), Michael Santos: Ensuring 
Freedom, http://michaelsantos.com/endorsements/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2015). 
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But in contrast to what I think is often the unspoken reaction of 
lawyers to “prisoner example speakers,” Santos ought not be viewed 
simply as an object of fascination like some museum piece. He is plainly 
an intelligent person, hard-working and a thinker. He is also a living 
example of the mistakes—and the hopes—of America’s bureaucratized 
long-term imprisonment system, popularized in recent years as “mass 
incarceration.”6 
Just as significant as Santos’s “story” is his message. Santos adds his 
voice of experience to an increasingly large and politically diverse chorus 
that recommends various mechanisms for permitting the safe release of 
convicted felons “early” from their imprisonment terms.7 Certainly this 
chorus is driven by some extent to the budgetary imperatives of the 
times.8 But it is also driven by people like Santos, whose crime was serious 
and who may well deserve both the retributive as well as deterrent 
sanction of imprisonment, but who also demonstrate, by a record of “merit-
based” achievement, that some sentences initially imposed are unnecessarily 
long. I would join Santos in suggesting that proposals for “interim looks” 
at lengthy prison sentences be considered, as well as systems of measurable 
“merit credits” toward release. And I offer some constructive criticisms of 
the American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) recent adoption of some steps in 
this direction. 
 
 6. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Mass Incarceration on Trial: A Remarkable Court Decision 
and the Future of Prisons in America (2014); Franklin E. Zimring, The Scale of Imprisonment in the 
United States: Twentieth Century Patterns and Twenty-First Century Prospects, 100 J. Crim. & 
Criminology 1225 (2010). The phrase “mass incarceration” is of relatively recent vintage, but 
recognition of the phenomenon is not. See Sentencing Reform in Overcrowded Times: A 
Comparative Perspective (Michael Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad eds., 1997). See generally Marc 
Mauer, Race to Incarcerate (1999) (discussing three decades of prison expansion in America).  
 7. Thus in 2011, the ALI adopted, as part of its long-running project to revise the Model Penal 
Code, three provisions that address various paths for the reduction of criminal imprisonment 
sentences. Model Penal Code §§ 305.1, 305.6–305.7, reprinted in Model Penal Code: Sentencing 
(Preliminary Draft No. 10, 2014) (on file with author). In a different bipartisan vein, Congress in 2010 
enacted the Fair Sentencing Act, co-sponsored by Republicans and Democrats alike, which, among 
other things, increased the quantities of crack cocaine that trigger federal statutory mandatory 
minimum sentences. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2(a)(1)–(2), 124 Stat. 2372 
(2010); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2006 ed. & Supp. IV) (prior to 2010 amendment). Further, 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) provides that upon motion of the defendant (or the Director of the Bureau of 
Prisons, or on its own motion) the court may retroactively reduce the term of imprisonment for 
inmates sentenced under the old guidelines. Finally, in July 2015, President Obama commuted dozens 
of lengthy sentences imposed on nonviolent drug offenders. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Gardiner Harris, 
Obama Issues Reductions of Sentences in Drug Cases, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2015, at A11. 
 8. See generally Hadar Aviram, Cheap on Crime: Recession-Era Politics and the Transformation 
of American Punishment (2015).  
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I.  A Brief Historical Sketch of Criminal Sentencing  
in the United States 
Since prisons were first implemented as a more humane alternative 
to death penalties or other physical torture,9 the pendulum has swung, not 
in a line, but in a circle or even a sphere, among various methods for 
determining how long convicted criminal offenders should be imprisoned. 
This introductory Essay is hardly the place to catalogue all the ideas that 
have been generated around the simple question, “how long?” But 
perhaps a short historical sketch, focused primarily on recent decades, will 
prove useful. 
A. Judicial Sentencing Discretion Has Been a Centerpiece of U.S. 
Criminal Sentencing 
History has largely neglected the progressive views that our 
constitutional Framers expressed in their first enactments on criminal 
sentencing in the 1790s. As I have explained elsewhere,10 the Framers 
confronted a world where much criminal sentencing was automatic 
(“determinate”) upon conviction. Laws, or common law customs, that 
provided something like, “Anyone convicted of [specific crime] shall be 
 
 9. See, e.g., Herbert A. Johnson & Nancy Travis Wolfe, History of Criminal Justice 183 (3d 
ed. 2003); Paul W. Keve, Prisons and the American Conscience: A History of U.S. Federal 
Corrections xi (1991). Jails of course existed previously, to hold persons accused of crime and the 
convicted for short periods (before exile or execution). But lengthy prison terms were uncommon. See 
id. 
 10. Rory K. Little & Teresa Chen, The Lost History of Apprendi and the Blakely Petition for 
Rehearing, 17 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 69 (2004). 
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sentenced to death,” were not uncommon at the time. Automatic 
imprisonment terms were sometimes similarly specified.11 There was no 
allowance for judicial sentencing discretion in that centuries-old model. 
But contrary to the Supreme Court’s simplistic (and erroneous) 
view, “fixed term sentences,” specifying imprisonment terms that were 
automatically set upon conviction, were not uniformly endorsed by our 
American Framers.12 Rather, our progressive Framers clearly envisioned 
that sentencing discretion exercised by judges, within indeterminate 
ranges set by the legislature, would be central to the new federal system. 
Nondiscretionary, mandatory criminal sentencing may have been the 
predominate sentencing philosophy before the Framers took over.13 But 
in 1790, the very first Congress enacted numerous indeterminate criminal 
sentencing laws, such as zero to seven years for falsifying court records or 
misprision of treason, and zero to three years and a fine of zero to five 
hundred dollars14 for misprision of felony.15 The fact is, the First Congress 
launched the federal sentencing system into the universe of setting broad 
ranges for potential criminal sentences that we have today. Just as obviously, 
they expected federal judges to decide where, within legislatively specified 
ranges, an individual defendant would be placed. 
Fast-forwarding 180 years, America in the 1970s still uniformly 
reflected the idea that the legislatures would set sentencing ranges for 
crimes, and then judges would choose a sentence within that range. In 
1972, however, U.S. District Judge Marvin Frankel published a path-
breaking book entitled Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order.16 Judge 
Frankel exposed the emperor’s naked truth: judicial discretion within 
indeterminate sentencing regimes appeared to operate without rationality or 
fairness, and the most influential factor in determining the overall length of 
sentence actually imposed was not the character of the offender or the 
severity of the crime, but rather simply the identity of the judge exercising 
the discretion.17 
 
 11. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) (noting a “19th-century shift in this 
country from statutes providing fixed-term sentences”). 
 12. Little & Chen, supra note 10, at 72, 74 n.5 (citing numerous points in Apprendi asserting a 
different view). 
 13. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479, 481. 
 14. Five hundred dollars in 1790 was a hefty sum, worth over $13,000 in inflation-adjusted 2015 
dollars. See Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount, 1774 to Present, 
MeasuringWorth, http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (enter “1790” in Initial Year, “500” 
in Amount, and “2015” in Desired Year; then look to “real price of that commodity”) (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2015). 
 15. Little & Chen, supra note 10, at 72 (citing an Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes 
Against the United States, 1 Stat. 112-119 (1790)); see also 2 Annals of Congress 1522 (1790). 
 16.  Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order (1973). 
 17.  Id. at 6 (sentences are “depending upon the judge”); id. at 23 (“a regime of substantially 
limitless discretion is by definition arbitrary, capricious, and antithetical to the rule of law”); id. at 25 
(“our sentencing judgments splay wildly as results of unpredictable and numerous variables”); id. at 49 
(“the unbridled power of the sentencers to be arbitrary and discriminatory”). 
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Moreover, in the intervening 180 years, an additional discretionary 
component had been added to the indeterminate sentencing regime the 
Framers first endorsed: parole.18 In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, progressive sentencing advocates developed the idea 
that, in fact, some if not all criminal offenders might demonstrate, over 
time, that they deserved not to serve the “top end” of their sentences.19 
The idea was that while some offenders might be compelled to serve all 
twenty years of a zero-to-twenty-years sentence, a larger majority ought to 
be released sooner than the end. A “rehabilitative model” came to 
predominate in criminal sentencing,20 hence the “Department of 
Corrections” title that was adopted by many state prison systems in the mid-
twentieth century.21 While society might hold a maximum twenty-year 
“hammer” over the head of would-be criminals, convicted offenders could 
be released well before reaching that top end if they were judged to be no 
longer a danger and capable of living by society’s rules. Once “corrected,” 
this philosophy averred, criminal offenders should be “paroled” into a 
supervised release situation, for their own good and the good of society. 
Once a concept of “parole” was accepted, another question was 
quickly—if unreflectively—answered: who should exercise the discretion 
to grant parole? The rationale for the answer—the executive branch—is 
unclear. Why should executive branch officials, appointed by a president 
or governor, be the ones to decide when prisoners should be released? If 
judges had been entrusted to make the original sentencing decision, why 
shouldn’t judges be similarly given the decision to parole? The answer, as 
best I can determine, was based on administrative convenience. Given 
that prisoners, once sentenced, were already placed into the custody of 
the executive branch—prisons being an executive branch agency—the 
idea seems to have immediately been adopted that the executive branch 
should also decide when to release the prisoner from custody, if early. 
 
 18. See, e.g., Andrew A. Bruce et al., The Workings of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and 
the Parole System in Illinois: A Report to the Honorable Hinton G. Clabaugh, Chairman, 
Parole Board of Illinois iv (1928) (noting that Illinois was “one of the first states, if not the first, to 
enact a parole law . . . about thirty years ago”). 
 19. Peter B. Hoffman, U.S. Parole Comm’n, History of the Federal Parole System 23, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/uspc/legacy/2009/10/07/history.pdf. 
 20. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989). 
 21. In 1912, the agency managing the California prison system was called the California State 
Detentions Bureau. In 1951, it was renamed the California Department of Corrections. Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation, AllGov California, http://www.allgov.com/usa/ca/departments/ 
independent-agencies/department_of_corrections_and_rehabilitation?agencyid=223 (last visited Aug. 
5, 2015). In 2004, this agency was renamed the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 
although given California’s budgetary difficulties it is difficult to find hard evidence of a true return to 
rehabilitative philosophies in California prison management. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 
1932–33 (2011) (describing how California state prisons have failed to provide basic mental health care 
services to inmates); Sara Mayeux, The Unconstitutional Horrors of Prison Overcrowding, Newsweek 
(Mar. 22, 2015, 2:55 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/unconstitutional-horrors-prison-overcrowding-
315640. 
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This allocation of authority may also have felt natural because the 
executive branch—the king—historically decided pardon, clemency, and 
commutation issues. Yet the rationale for why the executive and not the 
judicial seems unexamined.22 Perhaps a grant of release from custody, 
before the maximum end of a sentence was reached, felt more like those 
historically executive branch actions. But history, while providing an 
explanation, is not a rationale. 
In any case, parole boards were born, and they acted in an 
unarticulated partnership with the original sentencing judge to set the 
actual term that a criminal offender would serve.23 But the experience 
was not always a happy one.24 The position of parole board member was 
generally not viewed as prestigious, and the appointees were often 
perceived as appointed more on the basis of patronage than merit. 
Moreover, while “expertise” might be developed by parole commissioners 
presiding over hundreds of cases, empirical data suggested that the choices 
made—parole or no parole—were no better than if they were made 
randomly.25 That is, offenders who were paroled often re-offended; and 
conversely, some prisoners thought by many to deserve parole did not 
receive it.26 
Thus in the 1970s and ‘80s, the pendulum swung again. It had 
apparently swung too far, from determinate (legislatively directed) 
sentences, to wildly and seemingly arbitrarily varying discretionary 
sentences within indeterminate legislative ranges. To address this 
problem, the concept of trying to “guide” or regulate judicial sentencing 
discretion in individual sentences had been brewing in the states since 
Judge Frankel’s book. States experimented with increasingly detailed 
“guidelines” for their judges to consult before imposing a particular 
sentence.27 Finally in 1984, Congress lost all patience with judicial 
discretion, and enacted the Sentencing Reform Act, which would 
(1) make individual sentencing subject to mandatory “guidelines,” 
 
 22. See Sarah Lucy Cooper & Daniel Gough, The Controversy of Clemency and Innocence in 
America, 51 Cal. W. L. Rev. 55, 64 (2014). 
 23.  See Bruce et al., supra note 18, at 3 (“The [Parole] Board, in the final analysis, is the real 
sentencing body and to all intents and purposes acts and functions as a court.”). 
 24. See Frankel, supra note 16, at 47–48 (criticizing parole boards). 
 25. S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 57 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3240, 1983 WL 25404 
(“As Professor Norval Morris of the University of Chicago Law School has illustrated, parole boards 
are not able to predict with any degree of certainty which prisoners are likely to be ‘good’ release risks 
and which are not.”).  
 26. I had some early experience with the Federal Parole Commission in this regard, having 
litigated while in law school the court-ordered release of a federal offender because the Commission’s 
decision to not grant parole was palpably arbitrary and capricious. See Hearn v. Nelson, 496 F. Supp. 
1111 (D. Conn. 1980). 
 27. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364–68 (1989).  
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heavily restricting judicial discretion, and (2) abolish parole.28 The 
animating precepts were to (1) eliminate “unwarranted” disparities in 
sentencing between like offenders committing like crimes, and (2) 
establish transparent “truth in sentencing”: the numerical sentence imposed 
at the beginning would be the number of years or months that an offender 
actually served.29 
The 1984 Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”) generated the 1987 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines that are one focus of this Symposium.30 
The 1984 Congress gave the Sentencing Commission a three-year 
gestation period in which to develop the guidelines31—but in 1986, while 
the guidelines were still unpublished, a new Congress was elected. 
Driven in part by a more “tough on crime” orientation, and in part by 
what was perceived as a crack cocaine violence epidemic of the mid-1980s, 
this Congress had an even more severe conception of appropriate criminal 
sentencing, and “mandatory minimum” criminal sentencing statutes were 
quickly enacted.32 The pendulum had now come full circle: under the new 
statutes, addressing what were perceived as very serious crimes,33 lengthy 
mandatory sentences would be required, without parole or any other 
possibility of release before expiration, simply upon conviction of the 
 
 28. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which 
They Rest, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1 (1988). 
 29. That is, with the exception of credits for “good time served,” which is another aspect of 
criminal sentencing that has been long accepted and vigorously advocated for by the authorities who 
have the difficult job of supervising prison inmate populations. Especially with parole eliminated, 
prison authorities demanded that some kind of credit for “good behavior” be retained. See S. Rep. No. 
98-225, at 53 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3236, 1983 WL 25404. Without some kind of 
“carrot” for good behavior, which could be taken away if a prisoner behaved badly, prison authorities 
feared they would lose all incentive for good behavior of any kind. See id. 
 30. Hon. Charles R. Breyer, Keynote Address, 66 Hastings L.J. 1525, 1529 (2015).  
 31. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 historical and statutory notes: effective and applicability provisions (2014) 
(stating the three-year deadline for development of guidelines). 
 32.  See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the 
Federal Criminal Justice System ch. 2 (2011), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_02.pdf 
(detailing the history of the 1986 mandatory minimum sentencing statutes); see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 
841(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2010). 
33. The shift toward mandatory minimums and rising fears of a crack cocaine epidemic were 
pushed into overdrive by the ultra-high profile, powder cocaine overdose-induced death of college 
basketball star Len Bias. In the wake of Bias’s death, Congress adopted an increasingly aggressive and 
vocal “tough on crime” stance, and the House Judiciary Committee drafted and passed new drug 
sentencing laws on an expedited schedule—specifically, in one week’s time. H.R. 5394, 99th Cong. (2d 
Sess. 1986); H.R. Rep. No. 99-845, at pt. 1 (1986); Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug 
Prohibition Politics and Reform, 40 Vill. L. Rev. 383, 408 (1995) (describing how no committee 
hearings were held in order to move bills swiftly); U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Special Report to 
Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 117 (1995), http://www.ussc.gov/ 
crack/ chap5-8.pdf (describing lack of legislative history in passage of 1986 law). Indeed, the legislative 
history of this period reveals no hearings, debate, or study preceding the adoption of these provisions. 
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defined crime.34 The Federal Sentencing Commission has repeatedly 
expressed its opposition to mandatory minimum sentences, as plainly 
inconsistent with even the SRA’s discretion-limiting sentencing philosophy.35 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, hardly an ultra-liberal, and Justice Stephen 
Breyer, one of the architects of the Sentencing Guidelines, have also so 
opined, as have many other experienced federal judges.36 Indeed, given 
their enactment of undefined indeterminate sentencing ranges,37 one 
imagines that the progressive Framers of 1790 would agree. 
 1. The Contemporary Desire for Sentencing Reduction Mechanisms 
This brief history of criminal sentencing brings us back to the current 
moment, and Santos’s suggestive Essay. Why not have a regime that 
provides “a mechanism that would allow defendants to work toward 
increasing levels of liberty”—including early release, I presume—“through 
merit?”38 And why not have a mechanism for “a formal review that could 
include release?”39 I want to briefly expand, and expound, on both ideas, 
which I think raise different issues. One involves the concept of 
establishing a system of “merit” by which offenders could “earn” privileges 
and release. Here, we hear echoes of many others, both current and 
ancient.40 The second concept—establishing a system of review for 
determining when merit deserves additional privileges or release—
 
 34. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841. “Three strikes” legislation is another version of mandatory 
minimum sentencing—unforgivingly lengthy imprisonment sentences imposed on any offender with 
two prior qualifying convictions, no matter what the circumstances or offender’s characteristics. Again, 
after the 2008 budget crisis hit California, the people of California voted to establish sentencing 
reduction mechanisms for now-costly three strikes sentences. See Aviram, supra note 8, at 138–44. 
 35. See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Special Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum 
Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (1991), http://www.ussc.gov/news/ 
congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/special-report-congress. 
 36. See Jess Bravin, Two Supreme Court Justices Say Criminal-Justice System Isn’t Working; 
Justice Breyer Says Mandatory Minimum Sentences Are “a Terrible Idea,” Wall St. J. (Mar. 24, 2015, 
7:46 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/two-supreme-court-justices-say-criminal-justice-system-isnt-
working-1427197613; Associate Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association 
Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/ 
speeches/viewspeech/sp_08-09-03; Letter from the Honorable Robert Holmes Bell, U.S. Dist. Court 
Judge, to Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept. 17, 2013), available at 
http://news.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Judge-Bell-Chairman-Leahy-mandatory-minimums.pdf; 
Lynne Marek, Circuit Judge Asks for Loosening of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Legal 
Intelligencer, Sept. 14, 2009, at 4; Matt Apuzzo, Judge Attacks Disparity in Cocaine Sentencing: Far 
More Jail Time for Crack Crimes, Boston Globe (Nov. 15, 2006), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/ 
washington/articles/2006/11/15/judge_attacks_disparity_in_cocaine_sentencing/. 
 37. See supra text accompanying notes 12–15. 
 38. Santos, supra note 2, at 1557. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Santos highlights a system of reforms championed by one Alexander Maconochie in a 
nineteenth-century Australian island penal colony. See id. at 1561. In this system, prisoners could earn 
“gradual increases in liberty” through merit-based achievements. Id. at 1561-62.  
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presents different questions, not so much of “what” as of “who” and 
“when.” 
 2. Establishing “Merit-Based” Sentencing Reduction Opportunities 
Certainly others have expounded on the concept of “merit” sentencing 
reductions—indeed, this is perhaps the original foundation of parole as 
developed in the 1900s: early release when a prisoner appears to be 
“reformed” and no longer a danger to society. Thus, longtime practitioner 
and professor Margaret Love recently published a report on the “Second 
Look Roundtable” discussion of the American Bar Association’s 
Commission on Effective Criminal Sanctions.41 The idea of enacting a 
mechanism for “midcourse correction of a sentence lawfully imposed” is 
a centerpiece of these discussions,42 and I would leave interested readers 
to the account provided there. Much of the discussion focused on the 
ALI’s Model Penal Code (“MPC”) revision project.43 In 2011, the ALI 
adopted three proposals,44 suggesting legislative “principles” for establishing 
mechanisms of sentence-reduction consideration.45 I will refer to those 
proposals as a foil for the following thoughts. 
II.  The “What”: What Factors Should Permit a Sentencing 
Reduction? 
Interestingly, the MPC proposals divide the “what” into two very 
different sections, apparently based on the answer to the “when.” Thus, 
section 305.7 would permit a sentencing reduction for various specific 
factors, (including “other compelling reasons”) at any time during an 
imprisonment sentence. Section 305.6, meanwhile, would permit 
consideration of release for any reason,46 but only after fifteen years of a 
sentence have been served. Section 305.7 evidently envisions things like 
terminal or incapacitating illnesses of the prisoner, or perhaps of a family 
member. “Other compelling reasons” are not defined; perhaps this would 
 
 41. Margaret Colgate Love, Sentence Reduction Mechanisms in a Determinate Sentencing System: 
Report of the Second Look Roundtable, 21 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 211 (2009). 
 42. Id. 
 43.  Model Penal Code §§ 305.1, 305.6–305.7, reprinted in Model Penal Code: Sentencing 
(Preliminary Draft No. 10, Sept. 3, 2014) (on file with author). 
 44. Because the Model Penal Code (“MPC”) has no legal force unless adopted by a legislature or 
other authoritative body, everything it adopts is really just a “proposal.” Thus, the distinction 
announced in MPC § 305.6 (“does not recommend a specific legislative scheme” but “instead” just 
“principles”) seems a bit artificial. 
 45. See Model Penal Code § 305.1, reprinted in Model Penal Code: Sentencing (Preliminary 
Draft No. 10, Sept. 3, 2014) (on file with author) (“Good-Time Reductions”); id. § 305.6 
(“Modification of Long-Term Prison Sentences; Principles for Legislation”); id. § 305.7 (“Modification 
of Prison Sentences in Circumstances of Advanced Age, Physical or Mental Infirmity, Exigent Family 
Circumstances, or Other Compelling Reasons”). 
 46. See, e.g., id. § 305.6 (if “the purposes of sentencing . . . would be better served by a modified 
sentence”). 
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include the prisoner who saves the lives of guards or others in a prison fire, 
or undertakes in other heroic actions. One could easily imagine “compelling 
circumstances” overlapping with the “sentencing purposes” rationale of 
section 305.6—thereby making the fifteen-year minimum limit of section 
305.6 somewhat arbitrary, or at least vaguely patrolled. 
But my basic comment here is that the MPC’s proposals do not 
expressly specify educational achievements like Santos’s while in prison 
as a basis for early release.47 The good-time provision of section 305.1 
refers to “educational programs,” but only for “satisfactory participation.” 
Educational and other “merit” achievements, like Santos’s, should be 
expressly specified. 
Moreover, the MPC proposals do not recommend any rules directing 
prison authorities to facilitate, rather than obstruct, such educational 
programs for in-custody offenders. They should. Achievements like Santos’s 
should be encouraged and rewarded (absent other countervailing factors), 
expressly and without a fifteen-year minimum limitation. 
Of course, the criteria for what constitutes “merit” and how it is to be 
measured need to be published before any such system can succeed. The 
criteria should be as specific as possible, for the benefit of the prisoner 
(and her advocate) as well as the decisionmakers. Yet, like MPC section 
305.7 (“other compelling reasons”), any such criteria should also have 
some kind of general provision for accommodating merit requests outside 
the envisioned specific criteria (for example, “the prisoner discovered a 
cure for cancer”). And the goal of such criteria must be kept in mind. It is 
not merely to reward for something achieved in prison; it is, as Santos 
discusses, to give the prisoner something to shoot for, something to strive 
for and to work to achieve, while in prison.48 This means that a prisoner 
who won the Pulitzer Prize while in prison for a book she wrote before 
arrest would presumably not merit a sentencing reduction.49 
Of course, difficult decisions must be made about what should 
constitute educational “merit” as opposed to just “participation,” and, as 
in all reward systems, precautions should be taken to avoid “gaming” the 
system with meritless online educational credits or other standardless 
programs. It may be that the ALI’s 2011 proposals were all that that 
large and diverse body could achieve. One hopes that legislatures will 
seriously study the concepts and add as much specific detail as possible. 
Regardless, it is a sea-shift in current thinking that legitimate political and 
legislative actors are coming to see value in the idea.50 
 
 47. See id. §§ 305.6, 305. 
 48. See Santos, supra note 2, at 1563–66. 
 49. Arguments can be imagined, of course, on the other side. Welcome to the joy of trying to 
write specifics to capture general ideas.  
 50. See, e.g., Alison Lawrence, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Cutting 
Corrections Costs: Earned Time Policies for State Prisoners 1 (2009), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
documents/cj/Earned_time_report.pdf (detailing that in at least twenty-one states, inmates can earn 
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III.  The “When” and “Who” of Post-Sentencing Sentence Review 
Even if the concept of a merit-based sentencing reduction system is 
accepted—despite widespread academic endorsement, it is not clear that 
States have accepted it yet—it leaves at least two large questions to be 
answered: when, and by who? The following Parts address these questions. 
A. Timing 
The “when” needs to balance the desire to imprison no longer than 
necessary against the administrative costs of constant or repetitive 
applications for sentence reductions. Moreover, sufficient time needs to 
have elapsed in the service of a sentence, so that an offender can 
legitimately claim to having accomplished some “merit” achievement that 
deserves a sentence reduction. Two general directions seem possible. 
Either a set time could be established (for example, after five years or 
after half the service of the sentence51), with a period of repose then to 
follow (for example, may not be reviewed again for three, or five, or 
whatever, years); or, a merit review could be triggered by the prisoner’s 
own motion. For example, something like “a prisoner may apply for merit 
reduction after three years; but in the event reduction is denied, the 
prisoner may not reapply for three more years.”52 
Here I think the MPC proposal could use amendment. Serving a 
minimum of fifteen years as provided by section 305.6 of the MPC seems 
too long. Further, the MPC does not provide for any “waiting period” of 
repose after an application for reduction has been denied. Meanwhile, 
section 305.7 (“other compelling reasons”) does not have any minimum 
time period. It seems to me that only one section is needed, not two, and 
that after some minimum period that is not too long (three or five years), a 
sentencing reduction system should be driven by a prisoner’s own 
application, rather than by “notice” from the “department of corrections,” 
as required by section 305.7(1). 
 
time off their sentences by participating in or completing educational courses; in at least thirty-one 
states, merit-based “earned time” incentives are available). 
 51. The MPC proposal apparently could not be invoked until fifteen years of imprisonment has 
passed—thereby eliminating many potential reductions (for example, any sentence of less than sixteen 
years). Model Penal Code § 305.6. Other than perhaps “political” acceptability, the rationale for such 
a lengthy triggering time is obscure. The MPC proposal would allow an earlier application for 
“extraordinary and compelling circumstances.” Model Penal Code § 305.7. But that seems too 
narrow and extraordinary. If fifty-five percent of inmates achieve a college degree in the first five 
years—and thus not “extraordinary”—ought they all not be included in, at least, a merit-based review? 
 52. The MPC proposal apparently would permit only one application for “changed 
circumstances” reductions. Model Penal Code § 305.6. This simply seems like a bad idea—
administrative convenience being valued over the philosophical rationale for such reductions. 
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B. Who Decides 
On this question, sections 305.6 and 305.7 of the MPC come down 
solidly on the side of a “judicial decisionmaker,” and I firmly agree. But 
interestingly, when I proposed the idea to a panel of four excellent U.S. 
district judges at this Symposium, they appeared to uniformly reject it.53 
The question of who should decide when a prisoner qualifies for a 
sentencing reduction will, inevitably, be fraught with the uncertainties of 
the ultimate question: Who, really, can tell if a prisoner is sincere in her 
achievements?54 Who, really, can tell if a prisoner remains a danger to 
society, regardless of achievements? Initially, the ALI apparently 
discussed a number of possibilities: a panel of retired judges; a panel of 
“administrative judges”; or an executive-appointed sentencing commission 
or parole board.55 
But the ALI finally adopted a “judicial decisionmaker” as its 
answer. This, on balance, makes sense. The reluctance of sentencing 
judges is understandable: they do not want or need more work, and they 
may sincerely believe that after the passage of a number of years, they do 
not remember much about any particular offender or offense.56 These 
concerns may well be accurate. But in the end, my rationale boils down 
to “someone has to do it, and judges are the best of the alternatives, all 
of which are inevitably imperfect.” 
First, even if memory dims, the original sentencing judge will be 
more familiar with the offender and the crime than any other potential 
decisionmaker. At least at the time of the original sentencing, that judge 
studied both the crime and the offender in order to impose a sentence. 
And second, frankly, judges are on the whole more practiced, and (we 
hope) more careful and talented in making difficult judgments about 
sensitive matters based on less-than-perfect information. It is true that a 
discretionary sentence reduction system would inevitably allow some of 
the “law without order” variability in judicial decisionmaking to creep 
back into the system.57 But presumably rules and guidelines more precise 
 
 53. The Judicial Perspective at the Hastings Law Journal Symposium: Federal Sentencing Reform 
(Feb. 13, 2015). 
 54. Cf. Richard S. Frase, Second Look Provisions in the Proposed Model Penal Code Revisions, 
21 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 194, 195 (2009) (“inmates (and perhaps some staff) have a strong incentive to 
deceive the parole board”). 
 55. Id. at 198–99. 
 56. Although in my experience, such judicial claims are over-modest. Most judges can recall a 
remarkable number of their past criminal cases. Judges routinely say that sending offenders to jail is 
“the most difficult part of the job.” If so, then memory of those cases is unsurprising. 
 57.  Less than one might expect, however, as Judge Breyer’s Keynote Address indicates. Breyer, 
supra note 28 (noting that since Booker, which made the federal sentencing guidelines “advisory” 
rather than mandatory, a very large percentage of offenders are still sentenced within the 
recommended guideline range). 
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than existed in 1970 would be part of a well-considered sentencing 
reduction system. 
It is also true that some judges will retire or die, and their 
replacements, with no special knowledge about the matter, will have to 
be relied upon. Moreover, it is true that the human weaknesses and 
fallibilities of human judges, that always provide room for critique of 
judicial decisionmaking, will not be absent. But these are dangers in our 
human system that we must always guard against; a merit-based sentencing 
reduction regime will be no more, or less, free of such issues than any 
other aspect of our imperfect world. Again, judges are on balance 
better—not perfect. 
In addition, judges on the whole carry a number of institutional 
advantages over other actors, such as executive-appointed officials or 
retired judges. First is their familiarity with the particular offense and the 
offender. Even years later, they can be reminded of the facts by 
transcripts, recordings, and copies of pleadings. Second, judgeships in the 
U.S. legal system tend to come with some prestige. This means both that 
they tend to attract a talented group, and that they carry a sense of public 
responsibility and scrutiny not found as prevalently in other justice-system 
actors. Yes, the flaws of politically elected judgeships persist, although 
states as well as federal districts are increasingly implementing merit-
based judicial selection systems.58 But again, mine is a “comparison among 
the imperfect” kind of rationale. On balance, I think judges are better. 
Third, virtually all judges are protected from immediate removal by 
terms of office or, in the case of federal judges, life tenure. I am a fan of 
life tenure, in general, for federal judges; and even its critics advocate 
lengthy judicial terms.59 Such terms insulate judges, to some extent, from 
the pressures that might result from criminal sentencing reductions. And 
to some extent, those pressures are not illegitimate, but will serve to limit 
the scope of sentencing reductions to truly deserving inmates.60 
Of course, the impact on judicial workload of any merit-based 
sentencing reduction system must be assessed and the dangers protected 
 
 58. See John Schwartz, Effort Begun to End Voting for Judges, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 2009, at A12; 
James Sample et al., The Brennan Center for Justice, The New Politics of Judicial Elections 
2000–2009: Decade of Change (2010). 
 59. See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure 
Reconsidered, in Reforming the Court: Term Limits for Supreme Court Justices 48–56 (Roger C. 
Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006) (endorsing eighteen-year staggered terms through 
constitutional amendment); Sanford Levinson, Contempt of Court: The Most Important 
“Contemporary Challenge to Judging,” 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 339, 341 (1992) (advocating single, 
nonrenewable terms of eighteen years); L.A. Powe, Jr., Old People and Good Behavior, 12 Const. 
Comment. 195, 197 (1995) (suggesting nonrenewable eighteen-year terms); Saikrishna B. Prakash, 
America’s Aristocracy, 109 Yale L.J. 541, 570–73 (1999) (reviewing Mark Tushnet, Taking the 
Constitution Away from the Courts (1999)) (recommending term limits). 
 60.  Judith Resnik, Judicial Independence and Article III: Too Little and Too Much, 72 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 657 (1999). 
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against. This is true of any proposal that will add to the judicial workload. 
But there is an interesting historical parallel, now largely forgotten, in the 
federal system: the existence, until the enactment of the Sentencing 
Guidelines in 1987, of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b),61 which 
granted discretion to any federal sentencing judge to reduce (or correct) 
a sentence within 120 days of its imposition.62 The rule was abolished 
once the goal of “truth in sentencing” became embedded.63 But when 
Rule 35(b) was in existence, it did not generate overwhelming workload 
for federal judges.64 Once clear criteria for merit-based sentencing 
reductions are in place, judges should be able to quickly separate the 
potentially valid from the frivolous.65 And, of course, legislative authorities 
should always be mindful of the workload of judicial actors, and design 
and fund a system that does not allow justice to fail for want of resources. 
Conclusion 
I hope the foregoing has provided food for thought, and not 
distraction from reading Santos’s fascinating Essay. My overarching 
point is that there is legitimate and increasing support for the ideas that 
Santos advances, in his layman’s terms, and he has made a valuable 
contribution to our literature. Beyond that, my view is that judges, and 
not “lesser” legal actors, should be the ones to act as decisionmakers in a 
system of merit-based sentencing reductions, once such a system is 
developed as thoughtfully and as specifically as possible. And there ought 
not be a lengthy “mandatory minimum” of time served before application 
for reduction can be made. From that point on, as Justice Holmes so 
famously suggested, experience will be our teacher.66 And the pendulum 
will undoubtedly continue to swing, until we get it right. 
 
 61. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) (prior to 1987 amendment).  
 62. Kate Stith, Two Fronts for Sentencing Reform, 20 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 343, 343 (2008); Jack B. 
Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth 
Cardozo Lecture, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1224–25 (2008); Bruce J. Winick, Redefining the Role of the 
Criminal Defense Lawyer at Plea Bargaining and Sentencing: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence/Preventive 
Law Model, 5 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 1034, 1054 (1999); Joanna M. Huang, Note, Correcting 
Mandatory Injustice: Judicial Recommendation of Executive Clemency, 60 Duke L.J. 131, 134–35 
(2010).  
 63. See 5 Orfield’s Criminal Procedure Under the Federal Rules § 35:6 (2014). 
 64. See generally B. Carole Hoffman, Note, Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure: Balancing the Interests Underlying Sentence Reduction, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 283 (1983) 
(examining among other things whether a court should retain jurisdiction under Rule 35(b) after 120 
days). 
 65. Section 305.6(4) of the MPC recommends this: “procedures for the screening and dismissal of 
applications that are unmeritorious.” Model Penal Code § 305.6(4). 
 66. “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.” O.W. Holmes, Jr., The 
Common Law 1 (1881). 
